AUSTRALIA AND THE BOAT-PEOPLE: 25 YEARS OF UNAUTHORISED ARRIVALS

ANDREAS SCHLOENHARDT*

But finally, whether you succeed or not is up to you. Now is the time to decide and see if you believe you will succeed like other migrants to Australia.¹

I. INTRODUCTION

The world’s largest exodus since 1945 occurred 25 years ago with the fall of Vietnam in 1975. Many of those who left Vietnam after the war tried to escape by boat, bringing the term ‘boat-people’ into the language. Since the mid 1970s, almost every country in the Asia Pacific region has witnessed unregulated migration flows, and has viewed with varying degrees of alarm and anxiety the arrival of refugees and illegal migrants by land, air and, particularly in the case of Australia, by sea.

At 1 January 1998, one third or 7 536 500 of the world’s 22 376 300 refugees and other persons of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), had their origins in Asia and Oceania.² While political, demographic, social and economic migration pressures have increased rapidly in the Asia Pacific region, opportunities for legal migration have become scarcer and many countries have placed harsh penalties on unauthorised entry into their

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¹ From the information provided (in Vietnamese) by the Australian selection team to refugees in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia – “Brief Points for Vietnamese refugees coming to Australia”, reprinted in Australia, Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and the Refugee Problem, Commonwealth Government Printer (1976) p 118.

² UNHCR, UNHCR by Numbers, UNHCR (1998) p 2.
territory. With rising competition in a global economy and fears over declining living-standards as well as anxieties about multiculturalism, many industrialised countries, including Australia, are witnessing strong public anti-immigrant sentiments.

As the number of people willing or forced to migrate grew rapidly in the last quarter of the twentieth century, irregular migration has emerged as a major issue for most countries in the Asia Pacific region. In response to decreasing avenues of legal migration, people who believe themselves to be in jeopardy dare to take their fate into their own hands and migrate without the proper consent of national authorities, often facilitated by professional traffickers who ship their 'human cargo' across the seas.

This article seeks to examine Australia's responses to unauthorised arrivals and to illuminate Australian refugee policies in the context of migratory flows in the Asia Pacific region over the last 25 years.

II. THE FALL OF VIETNAM AND AFTER

A. The Vietnam War and the Refugee Crisis.

The Vietnam War (1965-75) and the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975 caused one of the largest movements of refugees in world history. The war made millions of people homeless, caused millions of deaths and forced millions to flee into other countries.

Many escaped by sea, using small, overcrowded vessels to save their lives and find refuge abroad. Some found asylum in neighbouring countries, but when some Asian nations refused to accept refugees from Vietnam, some of them were resettled in the United States, and in smaller numbers in Canada, Europe and Australia. The dawn of the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1978 brought a new wave of refugees from Vietnam, especially by boat. Initially, Vietnam did little to prevent the exodus, particularly in its early stages when most of the boat-people were Chinese from southern Vietnam who were 'squeezed' from Vietnam for political and ethnic reasons.3

Following the 1978 exodus, the United Nations called for a Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South East Asia, which convened in Geneva in July 1979.4 As a result of the meeting a number of countries, including Australia, pledged to establish resettlement places and refugee status for arrivals, and that an orderly departure program for Vietnam would be instituted.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Cambodia remained politically and economically isolated. Despite harsh penalties for illegal emigration, throughout the 1980s, Vietnamese continued to

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4 Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia, convened by the Secretary General of the UN at Geneva, on 20 and 21 July 1979, UN Doc A/34/627 (1979).
flee from food shortage, drought and flood and from the re-education programs imposed by the new Government. The number of refugees exceeded the pledges for resettlement allocated in the 1979 Plan and some countries even forced boat refugees back to sea.\(^5\)

Throughout the 1980s, the Asia Pacific region repeatedly witnessed mass migration from Vietnam, and, after two years of widespread famine, a further sharp rise in 1988. This again led to the implementation of entry restrictions and further push-back policies in many destination countries. Thousands of Vietnamese perished in the South China Sea.\(^6\)

Calls from ASEAN member countries led the UN to hold a second conference, the International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees, in Geneva in July 1989. The principal result of this conference was the declaration of the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action,\(^7\) forcing Vietnam to prevent clandestine departures and to introduce an orderly departure programme in return for financial aid. The plan also sought to repatriate the remaining Indo-Chinese who were living in refugee camps in the Asia Pacific region. Formal procedures for the repatriation of the remaining Indo-Chinese refugees were implemented in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugees Convention"), the 1967 Protocol and the United Nations Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. Those who were determined to be refugees had to be resettled in countries that agreed to accept them. Those who were considered not to be refugees had to be returned, often involuntarily, to Vietnam.

Despite the good intention to bring an end to the long-lasting refugee crisis, in practice, the plan was utilised as a tool to empty the refugee camps in the region and soon became the subject of widespread criticism. Many countries were quick to label those Indo-Chinese living in the camps as 'economic migrants' and sent them back to Vietnam, without proper assessment of their claims. Although the determination process under the Comprehensive Plan of Action prescribed the application of the refugee definition of the Refugees Convention and 1967 Protocol, it did not sufficiently prevent individual countries from applying their own standards when deciding whom to send back to Indo-China. Furthermore, the plan put those who were not adequately assessed in danger of involuntary repatriation.\(^8\)

\(^5\) For example, Malaysia 'redirected' boats full of Vietnamese asylum seekers out to sea; UNHCR, Report, UN Doc A/AC.96/751 (1990) 2. Also, Brunei, Singapore and Thailand adopted policies of no-entry towards refugees from Indo-China in the late 1980s; V Muntarbhorn, The Status of Refugees in Asia, Clarendon Press (1992) pp 97, 122, 139.


\(^8\) J Hathaway, "Labelling the 'Boat People'" (1993) 5 Human Rights Q 686 at 686-91, 696. See also A Helton, note 6 supra at 115-17; Y Tran, note 3 supra at 505-16.
B. Australia and the Indo-Chinese Boat-People.

Until 1975, illegal immigration and the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers were largely unknown phenomena in Australia. The geographical isolation of the country and the rigid White Australia Policy implemented immediately after Federation in 1901 enabled Australia to be very selective about who would be allowed to settle within its borders. The very few refugees Australia had accepted before 1975 were, for the most part, of European extraction, and Asian immigrants only came to settle in Australia after the White Australia Policy was abandoned in 1973. Australia also had no formal system for determining refugee status. The very small number of people who had sought asylum in Australia prior to 1975 were dealt with on an individual basis by the Minister for Immigration in exercise of his or her discretion to grant entry permits under s 6 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("Migration Act").

As refugees fled from Vietnam in ever increasing numbers, Australia suddenly found itself forced to act as a country of first asylum. Between 1976 and 1978, 55 boats carrying a total of 2,087 people arrived in Australia. By 31 July 1979 Australia had accepted a total of approximately 6,000 Laotian, Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees.

Initially, the Australian Government accepted very few refugees, most of them Vietnamese and Cambodian students already residing in Australia at the time North Vietnamese forces moved into Saigon. The Government tried to prevent the arrival of further boat-people from Indo-China by signing bilateral agreements with Hong Kong, Indonesia and Malaysia. Australia offered to take selected refugees from the camps in these countries if, in return, their Governments took steps to stop the boat-people from travelling to Australia. This move gave an early indication that Australia would be unwilling to accept on-shore refugee claims and rather select individual asylum seekers through off-shore humanitarian programs; a principle, that, together with deterrence and prevention strategies, would soon become characteristic of Australia's immigration policy.

In 1977, in response to the arrival of Indo-Chinese refugees, the Government established the inter-departmental Determination of Refugee Status Committee ("DORS") to consider refugee claims and make recommendations to the Minister. But despite the establishment of DORS, the Minister's discretion continued to be almost completely unlimited, particularly as DORS was not

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10 No 62 of 1958 [hereafter Migration Act].

11 For details on the selection of refugees from camps overseas and the admission of Indo-Chinese refugees see Australia, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, note 1 supra at pp 31-6, 46-8.
given any statutory basis and its recommendations were not binding on the Minister. The applications that were brought to DORS were decided on an ad hoc basis only and did not include a hearing of the applicant. Applicants were left without a chance to verbally defend and illuminate their claims and, even worse, given no right of appeal or review. DORS was not designed to make decisions on humanitarian grounds, assisting those fleeing persecution, and the ministerial guidelines prohibited the Committee from granting a protection visa (the visa category that entitles immigrants to stay in Australia on humanitarian grounds) to any person fleeing a natural or ecological disaster or general political or social upheaval. In practice, DORS determinations were simply an administrative process and, due to the composition of the Committee, strongly influenced by political considerations. The establishment of DORS crystallised the increasingly severe approach of the Government to refugees; it was clear that refugees were just another, more difficult, class of immigrants, and not a humanitarian exception.

At about the same time, the Australian Government commenced a deterrence policy which has characterised practices and policies dealing with refugees and undocumented migrants to this day. To prevent further people from coming to Australia, the Government responded to the increasing number of boat-people by tightening entry control and enforcing immigration offences. For example, s 4 of the Migration Amendment Act 1979 (Cth) repealed the option to grant entry permits after entering Australia, imposed all deportation and accommodation costs upon the ‘prohibited immigrants’ and barred them from entering the country again. Furthermore, the Act criminalised the carriage and the employment of unauthorised non-citizens. Simultaneously, the sharp rise of refugee arrivals and the lack of regulations and facilities to deal with them led the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence to recommend changes to the immigration law and the formulation of a new refugee policy for Australia. This resulted in the

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13 The DORS Committee had one member each from the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (“DIEA”), the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Attorney General’s Department, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and a UNHCR representative who did not have voting rights.
15 No 117 of 1979.
16 Migration Act, s 6(5).
17 Migration Amendment Act 1979 (Cth), s 12, now Migration Act, Div 10, ss 209 ff.
18 Ibid s 15(a), now repealed.
19 Migration Act, ss 11C, 30, 31B, now substituted.
20 Australia, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, note 1 supra at pp 89-98.
announcement of the following four principles of a new Australian refugee policy by the then Immigration Minister MacKellar on 24 May 1977:

a) Australia fully recognises its humanitarian commitment and responsibility to admit refugees for resettlement.

b) The decision to accept refugees must always remain with the Government of Australia.

c) Special assistance will often need to be provided for the movement of refugees in designated situations or for their resettlement in Australia.

d) It may not be in the interest of some refugees to settle in Australia. Their interests may be better served elsewhere. The Australian Government makes an annual contribution to the UNHCR which is the main body associated with such resettlement.21

Three years later, the Government formally implemented some of the obligations arising from the Refugees Convention22 and the 1967 Protocol23 (to which Australia became a member party in 1954 and 1973) into national law. Consequently, the new s 6A(1)(a), (c), (e) of the Migration Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 (Cth)24 exempted immigrants from the requirement to hold a visa upon arrival in Australia if they had been granted territorial asylum, refugee status or temporary entry permits on “strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds”.

Despite the attempts to deter further illegal arrivals, in 1979 and 1980 Australia continued to witness the arrival of large numbers of boat-people, most of them ethnic Chinese who were fleeing persecution in Vietnam. Approximately 2 000 people arrived illegally in Australia in the 1979-80 financial year. This led the Government to take further steps to prevent boat-people from coming. The Immigration (Unauthorised Arrivals) Act 1980 (Cth)25 amended the Migration Act by creating a complex ensemble of immigration offences. This time the new legislation targeted the “masters, owners, agents and charterers of vessels” who facilitated the migration of boat-people and brought them to Australia.26 The amending Act created and extended the powers of immigration officers, Federal Police and courts to board, search, detain and

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22 Australia acceded to the Convention on 23 Jan 1954; 189 UNTS 150, 5 ATS 1954.
24 No 175 of 1980. Section 6A(1) reads: “An entry permit shall not be granted to an immigrant after his entry into Australia unless one or more of the following conditions is fulfilled in respect of him, that is to say — (a) he has been granted, by instrument under the hand of a Minister, territorial asylum in Australia; (b) ...; (c) he is the holder of a temporary entry permit which is in force and the Minister has determined, by instrument in writing, that he has the status of refugee within the meaning of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees that was done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 or of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees that was done at New York on 31 January 1967; (d) ...; or (e) he is the holder of a temporary entry permit which is in force and there are strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds for the grant of an entry permit to him.”
25 No 112 of 1980.
26 See, for example, Immigration (Unauthorised Arrivals) Act 1980 (Cth), ss 6, 8.
for the forfeiture of vessels and arrest illegal immigrants.\textsuperscript{27} The 1980 amendments were followed in 1983 by the \textit{Migration Amendment Act} \textsuperscript{1983} (Cth)\textsuperscript{28} which strengthened the penalties for offences of document forgery and misuse\textsuperscript{29} and facilitated the deportation of non-citizens.\textsuperscript{30}

III. THE RISE IN ILLEGAL MIGRATION

A. World Events in 1989

After a period of relatively low levels of unauthorised arrivals, two major events combined in the year 1989 which gave rise to illegal migration in new, unknown dimensions: first, the end of the Cold War and the change of governments in many countries of the former Soviet Bloc; and second, the violation of human rights in the People’s Republic of China, particularly the massacre in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in June 1989. The former incident brought an end to long-standing exit restrictions and opened the borders for many people willing to leave political turbulence and economic despair in their home countries to seek a better life abroad, while the latter led to increasing numbers of Chinese refugees around the world.

(i) The End of the Cold War

The relative political stability of the Cold War era, when the world was clearly divided into Socialist and Western hemispheres, came to a sudden end with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989. The disintegration of the former Soviet Bloc and the formation of new governments in ex-Socialist countries caused profound change, leading to liberalisation and more freedom, but also to increasing anarchy in some countries and growing nationalism in others, often involving generalised violence and armed conflict.\textsuperscript{31}

For the Asia Pacific region, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc was less dramatic than it was for the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Today, the People’s Republic of China, the largest socialist country in the world, is still governed by the Communist party that successfully defended its rule against any attempts to introduce democracy and establish opposition. The Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, North Korea and Vietnam also remain under socialist rule. The transition in this part of the world over the last decade was more subtle as some governments tried to economically liberalise their countries without opening them up to democracy.  

Many countries abandoned the exit restrictions of the past and opened their borders for trade and travel. In circumstances where easier travel and migration coincided with decreasing political and social control, people took advantage of the new opportunities and moved to Western countries in search of freedom and employment, often beyond the control of governments.

(ii) The Tiananmen Square Incident

In early 1989, student protests demanding democracy and political freedom emerged throughout the People's Republic of China. The Chinese government quickly sought to put down the protests that obtained much public attention in Western countries. Throughout the country, police and military forces responded to the protests with violence, persecution, and imprisonment. The suppression of the protests reached a peak in June 1989 with the massacre on Beijing's central Tiananmen Square when the military killed numerous demonstrating students. Those who could escape persecution and imprisonment tried to flee to countries that offered asylum to political refugees.

Since the 1989 incidents, China has continuously been accused of violently repressing opposition and gaoling dissidents. The on-going persecution caused many students and others involved in pro-democracy movements to seek asylum in Western countries, particularly Australia, Canada and the United States, which initially offered protection to many Chinese dissidents. Also, those already studying and working abroad at the time of the student revolt sought refugee status in countries outside China.

B. Responses by Receiving Countries

The majority of the receiving countries of the post-1989 migratory movements, including Australia, responded to the increasing numbers of asylum seekers by placing legal and administrative restrictions on immigration and asylum. The shift in governments and policies in the (former) Socialist countries also caused a change of attitude towards those who had escaped from these

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33 For example, the Criminal Law 1997 of the People's Republic of China repealed the offence of "illegal emigration", formerly Art 176 of the Criminal Law 1979.
34 See, for example, the reports in "China erupts: 1400 shot dead, soldiers lynched" The Australian, 5 June 1989, p 1, 4-5; "Thousand run for their lives as troops open fire" (8 June 1989) The Australian 1, 8; "The Purge Begins!" The Australian, 9 June 1989, p 1, 8; J Pringle, "Secret police raid campuses" The Australian, 10-11 June 1989, p 1, 9; P Wilson, "700 snatched as China sets up hotline to death" The Australian, 12 June 1989, p 1, 7.
countries: formerly seen as refugees fleeing totalitarian political systems, they now began to be perceived as 'economic migrants' who sought to benefit from wealthier economies. Many receiving countries witnessed decreasing tolerance towards immigration and asylum, especially when public budgets became smaller and unemployment rates higher. Particularly disturbing to many countries such as Australia has been the fact that since 1989 more and more asylum applicants dare to independently take the initiative to migrate, rather than applying from overseas in long queues or waiting for their opportunity in refugee camps abroad. It is for that reason that refugees who seek on-shore protection have been described as 'queue jumpers'.

Stricter visa requirements, heavy border control, restrictive selection criteria and so-called safe third country policies implemented since 1989 have successfully reduced the number of legal immigrants and asylum seekers in most countries, but at the same time these policies have pushed asylum seekers into illegal avenues of migration.

IV. AUSTRALIA'S IMMIGRATION POLICIES SINCE 1989

A. The Increase in Refugees and Illegal Arrivals

Fourteen years after the first arrival of Indo-Chinese boat-people, refugees and asylum seekers once again became a major issue in Australia. But this time the number of boat-people was much higher, and the background and circumstances of these migratory movements were far more diverse and complex than the earlier arrivals.

| TABLE 1: |
| Unauthorised Arrivals to Australia by Boat and Air, 1989-1999 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boat arrivals</strong></td>
<td>243</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air arrivals</strong></td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>1347</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>2106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>1574</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>1383</td>
<td>1707</td>
<td>3032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35 See Part III.D of main text infra.
The number of unauthorised arrivals to Australia has significantly increased over the past ten years. The total number of illegal arrivals increased five-fold between the 1991-92 (610) and the 1998-99 financial year (3 032). The rising number of illegal arrivals is mostly the result of increasing numbers of unauthorised arrivals by air over the last five years. Although most public attention has been given to illegal boat arrivals, the majority of illegal immigrants have arrived in Australia by air (except for the 1994-95 financial year). The year 1999 witnessed the highest number of unauthorised boat arrivals. The number particularly increased towards the end of 1999 when 2 406 boat-people arrived between October and December of that year. Most of these new arrivals were Iraqi, Afghani and other Middle Eastern nationals, who fled after countries such as Iran and Jordan withdrew their temporary protection.

Together with more unauthorised arrivals, Australia has witnessed growing numbers of asylum applications over the last decade.

**TABLE 2:**

Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Australia, 1989-2000 (UNHCR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Asylum applications</th>
<th>Recognition under 1951 Convention</th>
<th>Rejection of asylum applications</th>
<th>Total recognition rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1 260</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>12 130</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>16 740</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1 470</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6 050</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>9 950</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7 200</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>9 070</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6 260</td>
<td>1 030</td>
<td>6 720</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7 630</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>6 790</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>9 760</td>
<td>1 380</td>
<td>6 250</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9 310</td>
<td>1 010</td>
<td>14 170</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8 160</td>
<td>2 490</td>
<td>7 980</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


40 UNHCR, “Table V.4. Rejection of asylum applications in selected countries, 1989-1998”, ibid. If the asylum procedure includes an administrative review or appeal process, such decisions are generally included. As a result, negative decisions may have been double counted (in first instance and in appeal/review).

41 Number of refugees granted Convention and humanitarian status divided by the total number of decisions taken. UNHCR, “Table V.9. Total recognition rates in selected countries, 1989-1998”, ibid.
Within one year, from 1989 to 1990, the number of asylum applications increased by over 10,000 cases from 1,260 (1989) to 12,130 (1990) and by another 4,610 cases to 16,740 in 1991. Many of the applicants were Chinese citizens who initially entered the country as students and who, as a consequence of the June 1989 events in the People’s Republic of China, became refugees sur place. The number of asylum applications dropped again to 6,050 in 1992 but it remained at a high level throughout the 1990s. Some of the applicants who (average 14.42 per cent 1990-98) fell within the ambit of the Refugees Convention, were granted refugee status and given protection visas to stay in Australia. But the majority fled as a result of factors that are not recognised in international refugee law, such as generalised violence, civil disorder and conditions of poverty. Consequently, their applications were rejected and most of the unsuccessful applicants removed from Australia. The number of rejections reached its peak in 1997 when 14,170 applicants were refused and only 6.6 per cent were granted refugee status.

Starting with the events of the year 1989, unauthorised arrivals in Australia reached an unprecedented level. That same year, the Australian Government commenced what retrospectively can be regarded as a policy of ‘unauthorising’ irregular migrants and deterring refugees. Over the past ten years, Australian immigration policy has been characterised by measures that seek to stop people from entering Australia and to detain and remove those that manage to reach Australian territory, rather than by attempts to find humanitarian solutions for international migration and refugee crises.

B. The 1989 Amendments

The Government’s first response to the 1989 arrivals was the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth), which signalled a firmer stand on illegal immigration. By strengthening border controls, introducing mandatory detention and the removal of illegal entrants, and limiting opportunities for judicial review, this major reform work sought to deter those people who applied for refugee status on-shore rather than going through Australia’s humanitarian off-shore program.

The main features of the 1989 reforms included the tightening of immigration controls and stricter provisions with respect to illegal entrants. Sections 6(1), (2), (3) and 11A of the Migration Act were amended so that any person who gained entry to or resided in Australia without any immigration documents or

42 Sur place refugees are people who are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin because of events occurring after their departure from that country.
43 No 59 of 1989.
with false documentation automatically became a ‘prohibited non-citizen’. The legislation failed to recognise the fact that many refugees did not, and still do not have either the time or the opportunity to obtain valid documents. Secondly, the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth) removed some of the Minister’s and their officers’ discretion by codifying the grounds on which the Minister could grant entry permits and determine refugee status, as well as by increasing the number of mandatory provisions. This move made refugee determination more predictable, but the procedure also became much more inflexible, streamlined and bureaucratic rather than enabling quick, humanitarian solutions for those in need.

Furthermore, the powers of immigration officers to search and arrest illegal immigrants were broadened. A new system for the review of migration decisions was introduced by creating the Migration Internal Review Organisation ("MIRO") and the Immigration Review Tribunal ("IRT"). But the review of immigration cases remained very limited and the regulations governing the decisions of the Immigration Review Tribunal were too narrow to adequately respond to well-founded applications for asylum. For example, onshore applicants had no right of appeal if the Minister or his officers refused refugee status at the primary stage. Also, the IRT itself could not vary or set aside ministerial decisions and grant entry permits on humanitarian grounds.

Finally, the amendments introduced mandatory deportation of unauthorised arrivals after a 28 day ‘period of grace’. Once the deportation order had been made, an entry permit could no longer be granted and even the Minister had no discretion to revoke the order. Ever since 1989, the mandatory detention and immediate removal of illegal entrants has been utilised in Australian immigration policies as a deterrence to other boat-people.

The amendments made by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 were considered unsatisfactory by many who had called for a humanitarian reform of Australian immigration law. Major points of criticism were that the amendments to the Migration Act did not include the definition of refugee found in the Refugees Convention and that some of the new regulations did not comply with the provisions of the Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Furthermore, until today the policy of mandatory detention and removal raises concerns about breaches of Australia’s international obligations, especially as involuntary removal can amount to refoulement contrary to Article 33 of the Refugees

45 Now “unlawful non-citizen”, Migration Act, s 14.
46 Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth), ss 18-20, now Migration Act, ss 252 ff.
48 Ibid, s 25, now repealed.
49 Ibid, s 8. The 28-day period was substituted by “removal as soon as practicable”, Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth), s 13, now Migration Act, s 198(1).
50 See, for example, Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, vol HR 183 p 2371 ((5 May 1992) G Hand, Minister for Immigration); R McGregor, “Minister warns of boatpeople flood” The Australian, 16 Nov 1999, p 1.
Soon after the 1989 reforms, as a result of the high number of asylum applications and the increasing workload of DORS in 1989 and 1990 (the number of asylum applications rose from 1,260 in 1989 to 12,130 in 1990), the Minister further streamlined the procedure of asylum applications, gave the Committee more responsibilities and staff and renamed the DORS committee the Refugee Status Review Committee ("RSRC").

C. The 1991-93 Amendments

The number of applications for asylum continued to grow from 12,130 cases in 1990 to 16,740 in 1991. In an attempt to deter further arrivals and reduce the number of asylum applications, the Government limited the protection offered to refugees. In 1990, the validity of refugee (restricted) visas was limited to "a period not exceeding 4 years". One year later, a new category of entry permits for on-shore applicants was established ("Domestic Protection (Temporary) Entry Permit") which provided that successful applicants would only be granted temporary visas, allowing them to stay in Australia for up to four years.

Throughout the years 1990-91, the large number of asylum applications, particularly of Chinese citizens, created massive problems for the refugee determination system and caused major delays in processing asylum applications. In some cases, people who entered the country legally became illegal simply because their initial temporary permit expired and immigration authorities failed to decide their refugee claims in time. Those who arrived illegally and had been detained upon arrival had to remain in custody for up to four years before their cases were finalised. Furthermore, the high influx of illegal entrants and their prolonged detention exceeded the capacities of the

51 Australia, Joint Select Committee on Migration Regulations, First Report to the Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, RP Rubic (1989) p 5, para [1.17], and pp 13-21; M Crock, "Immigration: Understanding the New System", note 44 supra at p 4; P Hyndman, note 14 supra at 547-8; B Murray, "Australia's New Refugee Policies" (1990) 2(4) IJRL 620 at 622; A Patel, Note 44 supra at 70. For the wording of Art 33 of the Refugees Convention, see note 85 infra and accompanying text.

52 See Table 2 supra.

53 Ibid.

54 Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1990 (No 237), reg 21, repealed by Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1991 (No 25), reg 8.

55 Migration Regulations (Cth) Class 84, Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1991 (No 25), reg 9. Cf B Murray, note 51 supra at 621-4; J Crawford, note 44 supra at 627.

56 For example: A Cambodian refugee applied for refugee status on 13 December 1989 and was taken into detention on 21 December 1989. In January 1994, he was granted refugee status and released from detention. The case was brought to the UN Human Rights Committee. In April 1997, the Committee found that Australia had breached some of its obligations under the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights; UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/1993 (1993), reprinted in UN, Human Rights Committee, "Communication No 560/1993, A v Australia" (1997) 9 IJRL 506-27. For further reading see Australia, "Response of the Australian Government to the Views of the Human Rights Committee in Communication No 560/1993 (A v Australia)" (1997) 9 IJRL 674-8; R Piotrowicz, "The Detention of Boat People and Australia's Human Rights Obligations" (1998) 72(6) ALJ 417-25.
existing detention centres in Australia. The quick answer the Government found for overcrowded facilities was the opening of a new large detention centre in the remote, disused mining camp of Port Hedland, Western Australia, in 1991.57

Humanitarian and international organisations criticised the handling of illegal immigrants in Australia, but the Government initially remained irresponsive. The Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth),58 passed in May 1992, sought, once again, to prevent clandestine travel to Australia by enforcing the detention of unauthorised entrants59 and prohibiting the courts from the release of ‘designated people’ from detention without their claims being finalised.60

Finally, in 1992, an attempt was made to reduce the processing delays and change the way in which immigration decisions were made and reviewed. Legislation was passed in December 1992 (Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth))61 and came into force on 1 September 1994. The Migration Reform Act repealed large parts of the Migration Act and renumbered the Act entirely. The Act inserted s 26B into the Migration Act, finally establishing a statutory category of temporary protection visas for refugees:

26B (1) There is a class of temporary visas to be known as protection visas.

(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.62

During 1993-94 the Australian Government realised that temporary protection caused too much uncertainty for refugees. The category of Domestic Protection (Temporary) Entry Permits was abandoned, the word ‘temporary’ omitted from s 26B(1) of the Migration Act,63 and the Government returned to offer permanent protection to refugees, including those who applied on-shore.

Simultaneously, and unsurprisingly, the Government stepped up its deterrence policy with respect to unauthorised arrivals by introducing a new Division 4C (“Detention of unlawful non-citizens”) into the Migration Act. The changes tightened detention regulations drastically by prohibiting any release from detention without explicit authority and further limited the court’s power to release “unlawful non-citizens”.64 Moreover, immigration officers were given broader authority to detain and remove all persons who arrived and/or were

59 Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth), s 3, now Migration Act, ss 176-187.
61 No 184 of 1992 [hereafter “Migration Reform Act”].
62 Now s 36 of the Migration Act.
63 Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth), s 9: “Section 26B of the Principal Act is amended by omitting from subsection (1) “temporary”.
64 Migration Act, s 54ZD(3) as amended by the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth), now Migration Act, s 196(3).
staying in Australia without valid permission.65

The 1992 amendments also led to major changes for the review of refugee status decisions. On the one hand, the Migration Amendment Act 1991 (Cth)66 finally adopted the international definition of refugees of the Refugees Convention67 and the Migration Amendment Act (No 2) 1992 (Cth)68 formally introduced a procedure for the determination of refugee status into the Migration Act.69 The Migration Reform Act 1992, in Part 4A, created a new, independent administrative tribunal – the Refugee Review Tribunal – to review decisions that refused or cancelled protection visas, replacing the Refugee Status Review Committee, that was established only three years before.70 Unlike the predecessor DORS and RSRC committees, the procedures of the new Tribunal were rather informal. Applicants now had to be heard before the Tribunal71 and decisions had to be made on the basis of the 1951 Refugees Convention definition.72 Cases that were refused by the RRT could be brought by appeal to the Federal Court, resulting in a major increase in the number of applications at review stage between the 1991-92 (229 cases) and the 1992-93 financial year (2 339).73 Also, s 166BE of the Migration Act provided that the Minister could substitute the decision of the Tribunal with one more favourable to the applicant.74

But on the other hand, the review of refugee claims was further streamlined and the juridical powers of the Tribunal were limited against adverse decisions by the Department of Immigration and the Minister. With the establishment of the Refugee Review Tribunal the number of rejected refugee claims grew substantially from only 1 470 cases in 1991 to 9 950 in 1992, and the total recognition rate dropped significantly (1990: 31.8 per cent, 1991: 11.4 per cent, 1992: 5.8 per cent, 1993: 9.9 per cent).75 This sharp decline raised questions

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65 Migration Act, ss 54W, 54ZF, as amended by the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth), now ss 189, 198 of the Migration Act. For further reading see, for example, Australia, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, note 60 supra at 17-8; R Birrell, note 14 supra at 115.


67 Migration Amendment Act 1991 (Cth), s 3(e).

68 No 84 of 1992.

69 Migration Amendment Act (No 2) 1992 (Cth), s 8, Migration Act, ss 22AA-22AD, now substituted by Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Subclass 200 — Refugee.

70 Now ss 411-473 of the Migration Act.

71 Section 166DB, now s 425 of the Migration Act.


74 Now Migration Act, s 417.

75 Figures from Table 2 supra.
about how adequately Australia had been assessing refugee claims.\textsuperscript{76}

D. 1994-1998

Starting in late 1994, the number of unauthorised arrivals in Australia increased further. In the 1994-95 financial year, the Immigration Department recorded 1,089 people arriving illegally by boat in addition to 485 unauthorised arrivals by air.\textsuperscript{77} The implementation of the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the repatriation of Vietnamese refugees who were detained in camps throughout the Asia Pacific region, led some of them to flee from the camps to Australia. Also, many of the new arrivals were Vietnamese who had been resettled in China and became displaced when the Chinese government moved to redevelop these areas.

Once the migrants reached Australia, most of them applied for refugee status, which caused a significant increase in the number of refugee applications (10,490 cases in the 1993-94 financial year).\textsuperscript{78} The growing rate of successful refugee status applications (12.8 per cent in 1993-94)\textsuperscript{79} caused fears that this would “sen[d] the wrong message abroad”,\textsuperscript{80} encouraging others to come to Australia. Calls emerged for preventive and restrictive measures to reduce the number of asylum claims. Once again, these motions resulted in further amendments to the \textit{Migration Act}.

The answer to increasing asylum claims was found in the ‘safe third country’ policy, a legal instrument that derives from the law of several European countries.\textsuperscript{81} The \textit{Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 4) 1994 (Cth)}\textsuperscript{82} implemented ss 91B-91D into the \textit{Migration Act}. The changes to the legislation provided that applicants who were covered by the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action and who had been assessed overseas for refugee status prior to arrival in Australia would not be reassessed by Australian authorities. Secondly, applicants who had arrived in Australia from designated safe third countries (as defined in s 91D \textit{Migration Act}) became ineligible for refugee status (\textit{Migration Act}, s 91E) and:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} Cf Australia, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, note 60 supra at 34-6; R Birrell, note 14 supra at p 114; M Crock, note 14 supra at 40-1; J Fonteyne, “Refugee Determination in Australia” (1994) 6 IJRL 253 at 255-9.
\item \textsuperscript{77} See Table 1 supra.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Figures from Table 2 supra.
\item \textsuperscript{79} See Table 2 supra.
\item \textsuperscript{80} M Crock, note 14 supra at 40-4.
\item \textsuperscript{81} See, for example, the Art 30 of the Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 JUNE 1985 between the Governments of the States of the BENELUX Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 19 June 1990; Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged on One of the Member States of the European Communities, signed in Dublin, 15 June 1990. See also the references in J Fitzpatrick, “Flight from Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary ‘Refuge’ and Local Responses to Forced Migrations” (1994) 35(1) VA JIL 13 at 33, n 91.
\item \textsuperscript{82} No 136 of 1994.
\end{itemize}
should not be allowed to apply for a protection visa or, in some cases, any other visa. Any such non-citizen who is an unlawful non-citizen will be subject to removal under Division 8.

In addition to the implementation of the safe third country policy, the Government further restricted the availability of protection visas by inserting ss 48A and 48B into the \textit{Migration Act},\footnote{\textit{Migration Act}, s 91A. For details of Australia's safe third country policy see M Crock, note 9 supra, pp 154-5; S Taylor, "Australia's 'Safe Third Country' Provisions: Their Impact on Australia's Fulfilment of Its Non-Refoulement Obligations" (1996) 15 \textit{Univ Tas LR} 196-235; and also Australia, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, note 60 supra at 24-5.} which provided that unsuccessful applicants would not be able to make any further applications for protection visas.

This policy soon became the subject of heavy criticism.\footnote{Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6) 1995 (No 102 1995), s 14.} It was argued that the safe third country policy would delegate the responsibility of protecting and determining refugees to countries which may have no or only questionable asylum procedures. Deporting illegal migrants to third or transit countries has also been regarded as a breach of the non-refoulement obligation under Article 33 of the Refugees Convention.\footnote{See, for example, F McKenzie, "What have we done with the Refugee Convention?" (1996) 70 \textit{ALJ} 813 at 820-1; N Poynder, "Recent Implementation of the Refugees Convention in Australia and the Law of Accommodations to International Human Rights Treaties" (1995) 2 \textit{AJHR} 75 at 82-5; S Taylor, note 83 supra at 209-31. For statements by the UNHCR see Australia, Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (30 Sep 1994) p 146-51 (P Fontaine, UNHCR Regional Representative); and UNHCR Executive Committee, \textit{Problem of refugees and asylum-seekers who move in an irregular manner from a country in which they had already found protection}, UNHCR Doc Excom No 58 (XL) (1989).} The principle of non-refoulement requires that Australia must be certain that the third country is willing and able to provide protection and offers a meaningful opportunity for the refugee to be heard before removal to said country. Since most of Australia's neighbours are not parties to the Refugees Convention, the 1967 Protocol,\footnote{Art 33(1) (Prohibition of expulsion or return ('refoulement')) of the Refugees Convention states that "no Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouluer') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion".} or to the major human rights treaties, it is a matter of serious concern if people are sent back to these countries.

The new policy was first activated in late 1994/early 1995 following the arrival of further boat-people from the People's Republic of China.\footnote{Of the countries in the Asia Pacific region only Australia, Cambodia, China, Fiji, New Caledonia (France), Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands have signed, acceded to and/or ratified the Refugees Convention and the 1967 Protocol.} Since the safe third country provisions initially did not cover Chinese claimants, the 1994 amendments were followed in January 1995 by a bilateral Memorandum of
Understanding between Australia and the People’s Republic of China,\textsuperscript{89} by which the latter became a designated safe third country for Vietnamese refugees who had been resettled in China (\textit{Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) 1995 (Cth)}).\textsuperscript{90} The applications for protection visas made by Vietnamese refugees from China were invalidated and the applicants immediately returned to China. Consequently, the number of refugee applications by Chinese citizens dropped from 8,912 by June 1994 to 4,335 by June 1995 and 2,223 applications by June 1996.\textsuperscript{91} Australia is currently seeking other possible countries with which to negotiate safe third country agreements, including New Zealand.\textsuperscript{92}

The Government’s rigid attitude towards illegal immigrants caused criticism on the national and international levels. The universal visa requirement and the mandatory detention of illegal entrants were considered infringements of Article 31(1) of the Refugees Convention.\textsuperscript{93} The new legislation did not recognise the fact that the majority of refugees have no time and no opportunity to obtain valid travel documentation and comply with emigration and immigration formalities. Furthermore, it was not taken into account that the transit points have in many cases posed threats to the migrants.\textsuperscript{94}

As a consequence of the restrictive measures towards on-shore asylum claimants implemented since 1993, the number of boat-people entering the formal refugee determination procedure decreased drastically while many others have been removed without their cases having been assessed.

\section*{TABLE 3:}

\textbf{Entry of Boat-people into the Formal Refugee Determination Process, Australia 1993-1996}\textsuperscript{95}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year of arrival & Entering refugee process number & % & Not entering refugee process number & % & Total \\
\hline
1993-94 & 199 & 100 & - & - & 199 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{89} "Understandings on special arrangements for dealing with current unauthorised arrivals in Australia of Vietnamese refugees settled in China", Beijing, 25 Jan 1995, \textit{Migration Regulations (Cth) Sch 11}, reprinted in K Cronin et al, \textit{Australian Immigration Law Vol 2}, Butterworths (1994) at [123-335]-[123-340]. Under the provisions of international refugee law, the allocation of responsibility for determination of refugee status from one country to another requires agreement between these countries to prevent disputes over responsibility and refoulement; P Mathew, "Lest We Forget: Australia’s Policy on East Timorese Asylum Seekers" (1999) 11 \textit{IJRL} 7 at 38.

\textsuperscript{90} No 1 of 1995, now \textit{Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)}, reg 2.12. Cf N Poynder, note 85 \textit{supra} at 84-5.


\textsuperscript{92} M Crock, note 14 \textit{supra} at 40-4; DIMA, \textit{Protecting the Borders}, note 37 \textit{supra} at 20.

\textsuperscript{93} “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorisation, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”


\textsuperscript{95} Australia, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, note 60 \textit{supra}, p 33.
In the 1993-94 financial year, 100 per cent of the boat-people arriving in Australia entered the formal refugee determination process. One year later only 14.8 per cent did so, while the majority of boat-people did not enter the process at all. In the 1995-96 financial year only 10.4 per cent entered the formal refugee determination process. Concern grew over the fact that unauthorised entrants who were held in detention centres would not lodge asylum applications as a result of insufficient assistance with their claims and inadequate access to legal advice and to human rights organisations. The *Migration Legislation Amendment Act* 1994 (Cth) repealed and substituted s 54ZA of the *Migration Act* which now provided that unlawful non-citizens in detention would only obtain assistance and legal advice in circumstances in which the detainee explicitly so requests:

Apart from section 256, nothing in this Act or in any other law (whether written or unwritten) requires the Minister or any officer to:

- give a person … an application form for a visa; or
  - a) advise a person … as to whether the person may apply for a visa; or
  - b) give a person any opportunity to apply for a visa; or
  - c) allow a person … access to advice (whether legal or otherwise) in connection with applications for visas.96

A recent study stated that in 1996-97, 80 per cent of illegal entrants by boat were removed from Australia without requesting legal advice.97 Current practice does not take into account that most immigrants to Australia face severe difficulties with the English language and are usually, if not always, unfamiliar with national legal and administrative systems let alone international law. As a consequence, these circumstances have created the risk that genuine refugees are sent back to countries “where [their] lives or freedom would be threatened on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”, contravening Article 33 of the *Refugees Convention*.98

The detention practice caused large numbers of complaints to the Australian

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96 *Migration Act*, s 193(2).
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission about the Immigration Department and its detention policy. This led the Commission to conduct an inquiry into the human rights dimension of the detention of unauthorised arrivals. The report, released in 1999, found a number of human rights violations and breaches of international law of the current detention practice. To date, the Australian Government has failed to implement the recommendations of this report.

E. 1999 and After

In 1999, Australia witnessed the highest number of unauthorised boat arrivals since the landing of Indo-Chinese refugees in the late 1970s. The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs apprehended 3,617 boat-people in 1999, compared with only 926 in the 1998-99 financial year. Anxiety over illegal immigration grew with the detection of the Chinese vessel Kayuen near Port Kembla (NSW) in April 1999 as it had landed further south than any other illegal vessel recorded. The number of boat-people arriving in Australia grew rapidly towards the end of 1999. Within the month of November, 13 boats carrying 1,179 Middle Eastern asylum seekers landed at Ashmore Reef and Christmas Island placing further pressure on Australia’s on-shore humanitarian program and on the existing immigration detention facilities.

The Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1999 (Cth), assented to on 16 July 1999, was the first response of the Government to the new arrivals. The Act created new offences relating to migrant trafficking. It also further reduced the right of complaint of detainees and repealed the obligations to provide unlawful non-citizens with visa and refugee status information unless explicitly requested.

Furthermore, the series of unauthorised boat arrivals that occurred along Australia’s east coast led Prime Minister Howard to establish a Task Force on Coastal Surveillance that submitted a report in June 1999. The report set out a list of 18 recommendations that called for stricter controls of Australia’s coastline, better cooperation with overseas and international agencies and a

99 For details see Australia, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, note 60 supra.
100 See Table 1 supra.
102 No 89 of 1999; previously titled Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 2) 1998 (Cth). Cf M Head, "The Kosovar and Timorese 'Safe Haven' Refugees" (1999) 24(6) Alt LJ 279 at 280. An earlier (unsuccessful) attempt to repeal the obligations to inform illegal immigrants about their rights and reduce their rights to complain was undertaken by the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 2) 1996 (Cth).
103 Migration Act, ss 232A, 233A.
104 Australia, Prime Minister’s Coastal Surveillance Task Force, Report, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (1999).
105 Ibid, Attachment A, Consolidated List of Recommendations, recommendations 8-16.
stronger legal framework.\textsuperscript{107}

On the basis of this report, Coastwatch, Australia's principal coastal surveillance agency, was restructured, its budget was significantly increased and the new position of Director General of Coastwatch was created. The Task Force's call for a legal framework took the shape of the Border Protection Legislation Amendment Bill 1999 (Cth) which was enacted on 8 December 1999.\textsuperscript{108} The new Act provided a catalogue of rigid measures which seek to prevent and deter the arrival of further boat-people. The Act created new and broader powers for law enforcement and immigration agencies to chase, board, move and destroy foreign vessels, within and beyond Australia's territorial and contiguous maritime zones, if they are suspected of carrying illegal migrants to Australia.\textsuperscript{109}

With respect to the increasing numbers of mainly Middle Eastern refugee claimants, and in order to deter further arrivals, the Migration Amendment Regulations 1999 (No 12)\textsuperscript{110} created a category of temporary protection visas for successful on-shore applicants (Subclass 785). This new subclass restricts welfare benefits and family reunification and limits the protection offered to refugees to a maximum of three years, if the applicant has arrived in Australia illegally. In addition, Part 6 of the Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (Cth) sought to prevent 'forum shopping', a term used to describe migrants "with a bona fide protection need [who] seek to choose a particular migration outcome as well as gain protection";\textsuperscript{111} in other words, people who migrate to a particular destination rather than to the geographically closest available country. The amendments introduced ss 91M-91Q into the Migration Act provide that:

\begin{quote}

a non-citizen who can avail himself or herself of protection from a third country, because of nationality or some other right to re-enter and reside in the third country, should seek protection from the third country instead of applying in Australia for a protection visa, or, in some cases, any other visa. Any such non-citizen who is an unlawful non-citizen will be subject to removal under Division 8.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

Moreover, people who unsuccessfully applied for protection visas in Australia, who have then been removed and later re-entered the migration zone are now barred from lodging further applications.\textsuperscript{113}

Although these harsh measures responded to a strong anti-boat-people sentiment in the public, the creation of this new, secondary class of refugees has been heavily criticised by humanitarian and refugee organisations. Concern has been expressed that the target of these rigid measures are genuine refugees and not, as intended, the traffickers who facilitate the illegal journey. Furthermore,
the experience of the year 1991, when the Domestic Protection (Temporary) Entry Permit was introduced, has already shown that temporary protection does not work as a deterrent for desperate migrants who are fleeing persecution and poverty, and that it only creates insecurity for refugees.114  

As of June 2000, the Commonwealth Government is considering further amendments to limit the rights of refugees under the Migration Act. The Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (Judicial Review) Bill 1998 (Cth), introduced into the Senate on 2 December 1998, seeks to reduce the grounds for judicial review of migration matters, particularly for unauthorised arrivals and intends to speed up the removal of unauthorised arrivals and prevent them from “using the legal process ... to extend their stay in Australia”.115  

V. CONCLUSION  

Australia’s wealth, stability and multicultural society are the major factors that make the country a desirable destination for migrants, both legal and illegal. Following the arrival of Vietnamese boat-people in 1975, Australia began to establish a comprehensive refugee determination regime, but simultaneously increased border surveillance and immigration control to prevent further boat-people from coming. The events of the year 1989, which mark the beginning of the most recent period of unauthorised arrivals, led the Australian Government to exercise even closer and more rigid control over immigration. Simultaneously, legal avenues for refugees to migrate to Australia have become scarcer as immigration offences were broadened and penalties heavily increased. The changes of the migration law effectively reduced the number of asylum seekers as illegal immigration has been further criminalised, and deterrence, detention and deportation have become the simplistic answers to unwanted arrivals.  

But none of the harsh measures that have been implemented in the past 25 years have reduced the incentives for migration to Australia. They have meant, rather, that potential migrants started to look for other ways to migrate, which they found in clandestine, illegal migration and migrant trafficking.  

Tightening borders and criminalising irregular migration has so far been unsuccessful in reducing the number of undocumented immigrants and deterring further arrivals. The amendments that have been made to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) have not addressed the incentives for illegal migration and have failed to consider the migration pressures that exist in the Asia Pacific region.


115 Australia, Senate, Debates, vol HR 193, p 1025 ((5 May 1998) Senator Patterson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs).
The combination of push-factors such as war, persecution, poverty and environmental degradation in the sending countries, pull-factors such as protection and employment opportunities in the destination countries, together with the growth of multiculturalism have caused growing demand for migration to the extent that many people are willing to invest life-savings and risk the dangers of illegal migration to start a new life abroad. As long as Australia remains ignorant towards the causes of refugee and migratory movements, illegal immigration is destined to increase further and reach yet unknown heights.